to support theories that conceive of partisanship as a social identity (e.g., Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) , while evidence of unstable partisanship is thought to support a more rationalistic interpretation of partisanship as a 'running tally' of performance evaluations (e.g., Thomassen 1976) . But these studies tell us little about the circumstances under which parties successfully grow their partisan base.
A handful of studies took up the reverse question -why partisanship erodeswhen, in the 1970s and 1980s, scholars of advanced democracies observed aggregate declines in reported partisan attachments. Most offered structural explanations that emphasized the spread of education, emerging mass media, or public financing of parties (Dalton 1984; Flanagan and Dalton 1984; Inglehart 1977; Katz and Mair 1995; Ward 1993 ). Yet these arguments found little empirical support in analyses of aggregate and individual-level data (Albright 2009; Arzheimer 2006; Berglund et al. 2006; Huber, Kernell, and Leoni 2005; Schmitt-Beck, Wieck, and Christoph 2006; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995) . 3 More recently, scholars of developing democracies have also begun to grapple with trends of partisan erosion (Lupu 2014, Forthcoming; Morgan 2011; Seawright 2012) . But theories of partisan erosion do not necessarily tell us about partisan emergence.
As a result, we still know little about where mass partisanship comes from, a crucial question for understanding how and when party-building succeeds. Developing democracies -where parties are nascent or partisan attachments weakened by authoritarian interludes -offer opportunities for studying how partisanship emerges. In these settings, some new parties successfully cultivate mass attachments whereas others do not. How do we explain these divergent outcomes?
I argue that one important determinant of whether new parties succeed in building a partisan base is their ability to develop a strong and broad-based party brand (see Lupu 2014, Forthcoming) . Party brands give voters an idea of the type of citizen a particular party represents. When parties offer a demonstrably consistent brand that appeals to a substantial swath of the electorate, voters attracted to that brand are more likely to form lasting attachments. When parties are inconsistent, constantly shifting positions, such attachments are unlikely to form. At the same time, partisanship also depends upon voters' ability to distinguish among competing parties. If the differences between the parties are trivial, voters will fail to form strong attachments to one party over another.
Voters will form attachments to a party when they see important differences between their party and its competitors.
Branding alone does not ensure that citizens form lasting partisan attachments; parties must also make themselves known to a citizenry that may have little experience with parties and often pays little attention to politics (Brader and Tucker 2008; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) . Often, parties need a presence in local communities to become a salient category of identification for voters (Samuels and Zucco Forthcoming, this volume) . But a strong party brand is a necessary condition -even if not, on its own, a sufficient one -for party success (Levitsky et al., this volume) .
This chapter argues that branding helps to account for the emergence -and, in one case, decline -of partisan attachments with new parties in Argentina and Brazil. In Argentina, the Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO) emerged in 1994 and successfully developed a leftist brand in opposition, one that it subsequently diluted when its coalition government pursued neoliberal policies. As a result, attachments with FREPASO grew in the late 1990s and plummeted during the early 2000s. During the 1990s, Brazil's Workers' Party (PT) gradually adopted a more broad-based, moderate leftist brand and benefited from the rightward shift of its main rival. As a result, its partisan base grew throughout this period. Despite vast differences between the two party systems, party brands appear to have played a critical role in building the partisan bases that helped determine the electoral fortunes of these new parties. 4 Analyses of survey data from Brazil further corroborate the underlying expectation that individuals who perceive differences between the parties are more likely to form partisan attachments.
Party Brands and Mass Partisanship
Scholars disagree about whether partisanship is a psychological attachment and social identity (e.g., Campbell 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) or a product of voters maximizing their expected utilities (e.g., Achen 1992; Fiorina 1981) .
Empirically, much of the debate between these contrasting perspectives -especially among comparative scholars -has focused largely on the question of partisan stability over time (Bartle and Bellucci 2009; Budge, Crewe, and Farlie 1976) . Evidence that partisanship is stable over time is taken to support the social-identity perspective (e.g., Green, Palquist, and Schickler 2002) , that partisanship is an "unmoved mover."
Conversely, evidence of partisan volatility is considered inconsistent with such theories (e.g., Thomassen 1976) . The underlying logic is that while voters' evaluations of party performance fluctuate from year to year, social identities form in childhood or adolescence -whether by socialization or learning -and stabilize thereafter.
Yet, the implication that partisanship must be stable if it is a social identity assumes that the objects of identity (i.e., parties) are themselves stable. The possibility that parties are themselves moving parts is rarely noted. This gap is no doubt partly the result of the overwhelming empirical focus of partisanship research on advanced democracies, the US in particular. In these contexts, the same parties tend to persist and their reputations are slow to change (e.g., Baumer and Gold 1995) . But in developing democracies, political parties are often new and may undergo dramatic transformations.
In these contexts, the implications of existing theories of partisanship are not immediately apparent. What can they tell us about the rise and decline of mass partisanship in developing democracies? Answering this question requires building upon existing theories about the origins of mass partisanship.
We can think of party attachments as group identities, akin to the attachments people form to social groups. 5 They are based on the stereotypes people have about each group (see Baumer and Gold 1995; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Rahn 1993; Sanders 1988) . People have an idea about what the prototypical poor person looks like, or how the prototypical banker behaves, and they categorize themselves into group identities by comparing themselves to the group prototype. Individuals identify as a poor person or a banker if they think they resemble, or fit, that prototype (Hogg et al. 1995; Turner et al. 1987 ). And they also feel closest to a group when they think other groups' prototypes look very different from them, a concept social psychologists call comparative fit (Hogg et al. 2004; Turner 1999) .
As with other social identities, a voter feels closest to the party whose prototype she thinks she most resembles, relative to all other parties. partisan, and the brand becomes stronger. As their uncertainty about the party's position increases, the party appears to be more heterogeneous, perhaps containing multiple prototypes, and the brand becomes diluted.
These learned party brands form the basis of voters' attachments. A voter will feel the greatest affinity with the party whose prototypical partisan she thinks she most resembles, relative to all other parties. As with other social identities, partisan identity is determined partly by the resemblance, or fit, between the voter's self-image and her image of the party prototype. Party attachments, therefore, increase as voters perceive they more closely fit with the party. The more strongly a voter identifies as a worker, the more strongly she will identify with the party whose prototype is the worker. But when voters are uncertain about what a party's prototype really is -when it is unclear whether a party really looks out for us unionized workers -the less certain they will be about their resemblance to the prototype and the weaker their attachments will be.
These attachments also depend on comparative fit, the degree to which a voter feels she resembles the prototype of one group and differs from that of another group. As Kirchheimer (1966: 192) noted, "There is need for enough brand differentiation to make the article plainly recognizable, but the degree of differentiation must never be so great as to make the potential customer fear he will be out on a limb." Thus, a voter feels most attached to a party when its prototype most resembles her and the prototypes of other parties seem very different. The worker identifies with the party for labor most when it is also clear that rival parties look out for opposing constituencies, like business owners.
Conceiving of mass partisanship in this way implies that the behaviors of parties can affect voter attachments (Lupu 2013) . In particular, parties can build their brands through consistency and differentiation. 7 When disciplined party elites present a consistent message, voters become increasingly certain about the party brand. Similarly, a party that maintains consistent positions from year to year increases citizens' certainty about its brand. Voters that are attracted to that brand will be more likely to identify with the party the more certain they are about what that brand really is. The more Democratic elites consistently seem to represent the interests of workers, the more certain voters will be in their perception of the Democratic prototype as a worker. Greater certainty means that workers will be more likely to identify as Democrats.
Parties must also differentiate themselves from prominent rivals in order to build a strong brand and attract partisans. They may offer very different policies from their opponents, or they may clearly demonstrate their opposition to the positions of rival parties. As they do, voters come to realize that the parties represent very different constituencies, and they become more likely to identify with the one they most resemble. 8 Even when voters are certain about two party brands, they will form stronger bonds with one over the other if they perceive substantial differences between them. It is not enough for Democratic elites to consistently look out for labor interests to attract workers; it must also be the case that Republican elites consistently seem to look out for business interests.
Partisanship thus emerges when parties are consistent and differentiated, but only among those voters who think they resemble the party prototype. So parties seeking a broad, national base must also appeal to a substantial swath of the electorate. A party may have a strong brand borne of consistency and distinguishing itself from competitors, but if that brand represents a minority of voters, its partisan base will be limited. New parties seeking a broad partisan base must, therefore, develop a broadly appealing, consistent brand that differs from rival party brands.
Doing so does not guarantee party success; grassroots organizations, voter experience, and mass attention are likely also necessary (Brader and Tucker 2008; Samuels and Zucco Forthcoming, this volume) . But building a strong and appealing brand is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for party success (Levitsky et al., this volume) . Indeed, cases of failed party-building often falter because they fail to develop clear brands (Eaton, this volume; Levitsky and Zavaleta, this volume).
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Through different trajectories, both Argentina's FREPASO and Brazil's PT achieved such broad-based, strong brands that yielded growing partisan bases. Unlike the PT, however, FREPASO quickly diluted that brand in office, eroding its mass partisanship.
9 Whether maintaining a strong party brand is necessary for the survival of parties once they become more established is a separate question. Indeed, parties that already have strong brands and widespread partisan attachments occasionally choose to dilute those brands for electoral gain (Lupu Forthcoming) . The fact that these parties sometimes succeed electorally does not imply that weakening their brand has no impact on their partisan base (Domínguez, this volume).
Building and Diluting the FREPASO Brand in Argentina
When The result was that mass attachments to FREPASO increased significantly. were concentrated in the urban centers and the party won only three Senate seats.
[ Figure 1 here] The UCR's presidential candidate came in third in 1995, in one of the party's worst electoral defeats in history. For decades, the UCR and PJ had competed fiercely.
Whereas the PJ promoted heavy state intervention in the economy and drew its electoral It was not long before the UCR and FREPASO began exploring the possibility of an electoral alliance. Unlike FREPASO, the UCR had spent decades building an organizational presence in rural provinces. An alliance with the UCR offered FREPASO an instant grassroots organization. But it also meant compromising some of its principles.
After all, the UCR was ideologically to the right of FREPASO and had become quite indistinguishable from Peronism. 12 FREPASO leaders like Carlos "Chacho" Álvarez voiced concern about the effects of a pragmatic alliance on the new party's burgeoning "identity" (Álvarez and Morales Solá 2002: 69) .
Still, leaders in both parties were aware that they could not win a three-way presidential contest in 1999. So in August 1997, the UCR and FREPASO formed an alliance to present joint lists in legislative elections that year. The Alliance for Work, Justice, and Education (Alianza) promised to make "corrections" to the economic model, particularly to address social issues and unemployment. In the October election, it garnered a plurality of the votes (though not a plurality of congressional seats), setting the stage for an Alianza presidential victory in 1999 (Cheresky 2003) .
Such a victory, though, would require arduous reconciliation between the two parties. In a hard-fought primary battle, the UCR's Fernando de la Rúa won out, but the parties agreed to make FREPASO leader Álvarez his running mate (Novaro and Palermo 1998) . De la Rúa handily won the presidency, but tensions persisted, both within and between the two parties, over their incongruent, if pragmatic, alliance. 14 Álvarez's resignation was apparently celebrated within the administration (Novaro 2009: 587) . A few months later, Álvarez also resigned from FREPASO.
15 Would a formal break with the administration have helped FREPASO preserve its brands? A great deal of damage was already done by 2001, so it might have been too late. Moreover, FREPASO had been so critical in getting De la Rúa elected that it is unlikely that a procedural break would have done much to dissociate the two in the minds of Argentines.
Argentines' attachments to FREPASO declined precipitously during the Alianza administration (see Figure 1) . The incongruence of the UCR-FREPASO alliance was not immediately obvious, particularly while the Alianza was in opposition in the final years of Menem's second term. But once in office, it became increasingly clear that FREPASO had allied itself with a party willing to implement the very policies FREPASO emerged to oppose. Forced to make difficult governing decisions, FREPASO abandoned its brand completely. Álvarez had been right to worry about the effects of the alliance on the fledgling party's identity. FREPASO would come to be seen as indistinguishable from the UCR and the PJ; all three seemed to the public to be supporting the same kinds of economic policies. The Alianza administration diluted the brand FREPASO had built in the mid-1990s and Argentines abandoned the party.
Building the PT Brand in Brazil
Scholars of Latin America long listed Brazil's party system among the region's weakest and most fragmented (Mainwaring and Scully 1995) . Among its perceived flaws, mass partisanship in Brazil appeared to be fairly weak and limited (Mainwaring 1999) . But since redemocratization, the Brazilian party system appears to have coalesced in some ways (Hagopian, Gervasoni, and Moraes 2009; Lyne 2005; Power and Zucco 2009) , and partisan attachments appear to have become more widespread and more meaningful (Samuels 2006; Zucco 2010, 2014, this volume; Sousa Braga and Pimentel 2011) .
Most of that development has been driven by the PT, initially a radical socialist party that emerged in the 1970s out of social movements and independent unions (Keck 1992; Meneguello 1989) . Unlike other parties in Brazil, the PT was widely regarded as programmatic, disciplined, and organizationally rooted (Hunter 2010) . In an open-list electoral system that fosters candidate-centered voting, the PT promoted the party label and consistently attracted more party-line votes than its competitors (Samuels 2001) . these two parties largely head up the major legislative blocs and regularly contend for the presidency, they are the most prominent parties in Brazilian voters' minds. The PSDB had always held a moderate ideological position, so its shift to the center-right should have altered the makeup of its support base without necessarily increasing it. In fact, such a shift might have weakened the party's brand in the short term by confusing voters (see Lupu 2014, Forthcoming) . But the consistently weak institutionalization of the PSDB, its subordination to individual leaders, and its decentralized organization have doubtless helped prevent the party from fostering a strong partisan base, either as a center-left party early on or as a center-right one since the Cardoso presidency.
On the other hand, the PT stood to gain significant partisan appeal from both its own rightward shift and from that of its rival. As Hunter notes, "The party's ideological moderation brought it closer to the center of the distribution of popular preference," (Hunter 2010: 38) making the PT brand seem closer to the interests of a larger swath of the electorate. That brand would need to be diluted somewhat to make the party's shift credible; in 2002, for instance, Lula's electoral coalition included a party of the right for the first time. 20 And any shift in program entails some inconsistency between the party's past promises and its new ones. But the PT maintained its commitment to egalitarian social policies even while it adopted more moderate economic ones (Hunter 2010) . It also maintained its deep links to civil society organizations (Amaral 2011; Samuels and Zucco, this volume) . Moreover, the PT benefited from its high level of internal discipline and from the pragmatism of its leaders, which allowed it to stake out a new ideological position without provoking internal conflicts like those experienced by FREPASO.
Party brands become weaker by confusing citizens when parties shift positions.
But some shifts may move a party closer to or farther from portions of the electorate.
Both proximity and uncertainty matter for partisanship, so some party shifts can generate countervailing individual-level effects. The PT's rightward shift likely confused some
Brazilians about the party's brand and weakened their attachments. But the party's moderation made it more appealing to a broader swath of the Brazilian electorate, who could now see themselves in the party prototype. In the aggregate, the positive effect swamps the negative one. This is no doubt partly because the PT's moderation was relatively slow, deliberate, and characterized by little intraparty conflict, in contrast with the rapid, conflict-ridden shift by FREPASO.
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The PT brand was also strengthened by the fact that its rightward shift did not entail completely converging with a rival major party. By the time of the PT shift, the PSDB had already abandoned the center-left. That meant that the PT's moderation did not reduce the differences between these rival parties. By some measures, the overall ideological distance between the PT and the PSDB actually grew somewhat during the 1990s and 2000s (Zucco and Lauderdale 2011) , particularly given the time that elapsed between the PSDB's rightward shift under Cardoso and the PT's subsequent moderation 21 Samuels and Zucco (Forthcoming, this volume) attribute the growth of PT partisanship to the party's unique grassroots organizational structure and links with local civil society organizations. In their reading, and following Levitsky et al. (this volume) , these organizational attributes provide avenues for citizens to participate in party affairs, in turn generating party attachments. But the mechanism by which grassroots organization generates partisanship may be informational rather than participatory. It may be that grassroots organization and close ties with local civil society help a party successfully reach citizens with credible information about what it stands for. As citizens learn this information, they will start to form attachments to it, as long as it also has a clear and appealing brand.
following his reelection. Other measures reveal little to no overall change in the differences between the two parties (Power 2008; Power and Zucco 2009) . Either way, the PT seems to have struck the kind of balance between differentiation and appeal that Kirchheimer encouraged. That meant that the PT developed a strong, moderate brand over the course of the 1990s and 2000s. Along with its other grassroots efforts (e.g., Samuels and Zucco Forthcoming, this volume; Van Dyck 2014) , the more widely appealing PT brand made it possible for the party to grow its partisan base.
Aggregate survey data largely corroborate these expectations. The upward trend in PT partisanship suffered somewhat during Lula's first term, perhaps because of the corruption scandal that engulfed the party (Hunter and Power 2007) , or alternatively because the PT's ideological comprises in office somewhat weakened its brand. Still, the overall trend of growing PT partisanship seems to correlate closely with the party's shift to a more appealing brand and its differences with the rival PSDB.
[ Figure 2 here] Interestingly, the PSDB has not similarly benefited -in terms of its partisan base -from its national prominence and consistent ideological differences with the PT. Why this is the case remains an open question. Relative to the PT, the PSDB is far less institutionalized, far less disciplined, and far more decentralized, which may mean that its brand seems more ambiguous to voters. Another possibility is that while the PSDB has an equally strong brand, it has not engaged in grassroots efforts to attract partisans, whereas the PT has (Samuels and Zucco, this volume) . A strong party brand may be a necessary condition for building a partisan base, but is not on its own sufficient, and the PSDB may be lacking the additional efforts needed to attract partisans.
Party Perceptions and Partisanship: Testing Individual-Level Expectations
The experiences of FREPASO in Argentina and the PT in Brazil are consistent with the notion that distinguishable party brands are a necessary condition for building partisanship. But the observed correlations between aggregate attachments and party polarization do not tell us whether individuals who perceive the parties to be more polarized are those who form a party attachment. They also cannot confirm whether the relationship between these variables is causal.
Unfortunately, individual-level data from the late 1990s in Argentina is sparse, Voters who perceive the parties to be further apart are more likely to identify with one party over another.
[ Figure 3 here] Still, these associations fail to identify the causal relationship between perceived polarization and party attachments. The ESEB surveys measure both perceived polarization and partisanship in the context of the same interview. Thus, these association may indicate the reverse causal direction, or perhaps a feedback loop between perceived polarization and partisanship.
One way to address this problem and identify the causal relationship between perceived polarization and partisanship is through repeated interviews of the same survey respondents. Indeed, part of the definition of a cause is that it occurs prior to an outcome (Finkel 1995) . (Finkel 1995: 25-6 This suggests that partisanship is somewhat stable over the course of the panel (see also Lupu 2015a). But the fact that prior perceptions of polarization affect current partisanship is evidence that voters become more partisan as they perceive more polarization in Brazil.
[ Figure 4 here] I find no evidence of reverse causation in the BEPS data. The right panel in Figure 4 reports the estimated effects of prior perceptions of polarization and prior partisanship on current perceptions of polarization. surveys from Brazil show just such a relationship, and allow us to identify the causal effect of perceiving party differences on partisanship.
Party Brands, Timing, and the Success of New Parties
New political parties regularly come and go in multiparty systems. But some succeed in becoming major competitors in national elections. To achieve that level of success, new parties must build a broad partisan base that cushions the party against rapid shifts in public opinion. Because partisans give their party the benefit of the doubt, successful mass parties need to build a base of partisans to rely on in unfavorable times.
Building a broad base of partisans requires an appealing, consistent, and differentiable party brand. Parties must stake out a position that signals that they represent a large swath of the electorate, and they must send that signal consistently to voters. If voters observe mixed signals from the party and its leaders, they will see an ambiguous brand and fail to form strong attachments. In addition, strong party brands require that parties differentiate themselves from their competitors. If voters see negligible differences between the parties, they are unlikely to form lasting attachments to one over the other. Instead, when voters unambiguously perceive a party that represents citizens like them, in stark contrast to its rivals, they are far more likely to identify with it.
Argentina's FREPASO and Brazil's PT both succeeded in building such a brand.
In the mid-1990s, FREPASO adopted a consistent and prominent center-left stance in opposition to the social costs of Menem's neoliberal economic reforms. At a time when
Menem's PJ and its traditional rival, the UCR, had converged on the reform agenda, FREPASO became a credible alternative. The PT pursued a similar tack. Eschewing the radical leftwing platform of its origins, the party shifted to the center-left just as Cardoso's PSDB implemented its neoliberal program. Appealing to a broader swath of Brazilians, the PT, like FREPASO, led the national center-left opposition at a time when the social costs of the Washington Consensus were being felt by millions of voters.
Indeed, those Brazilians who saw more differences between the parties were most likely to identify with the PT. Despite the vast differences between the Argentine and Brazilian party systems, these new parties developed strong brands and built growing bases of partisan support. Comparing their successes shows that broad, consistent, and differentiated party brands help parties attract mass attachments.
The comparison on FREPASO and the PT also suggests that, at least during the 1990s heyday of the Washington Consensus, new left parties did better when they remained out of office than when they won elections (see also Roberts 2015, this volume) . New left parties could stake out clear brands on the ideological left as long as they were not required to govern. Once in office, however, they confronted economic constraints that forced them into compromising those positions and eroding their partisan base (Lupu 2014, Forthcoming) , as the case of FREPASO demonstrates. Had FREPASO not pragmatically allied itself with the UCR, it would likely have remained in opposition for some time, strengthening its brand and expanding its partisan base. Instead, FREPASO entered a coalition government whose policies increasingly contradicted its brand, eroding the party's fledgling base.
By the time the PT won the presidency, in contrast, the Washington Consensus had waned and rising commodity prices provided leeway for leftist administrations to abandon neoliberal prescriptions (see Levitsky and Roberts 2011) . That allowed the PT to maintain its center-left position on redistribution and social programs without sacrificing macroeconomic stability. The PT had gradually abandoned aspects of its more radical early brand, but it did so with abandoning its entire platform, as FREPASO did. The PT's inconsistency also brought it closer to mainstream Brazilian voters, increasing its potential appeal. It seems one crucial reason for the PT's success in building a partisan following was its repeated national electoral defeats; had Lula won the presidency in 1989, his party's fate would likely have looked more like FREPASO's. 
